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Abstract: 
This paper contributes to the research on corporate governance by predicting the effects of European takeover 
regulation. In particular, we investigate whether the recent reforms of takeover regulation in Europe are leading to a 
harmonization of the national legislations. With the help of 150 corporate governance lawyers from 30 European 
countries, we collected the main changes in takeover regulation. We assess whether a process of convergence towards 
the Anglo-(American) corporate governance system has been started and we find that this is the case. We make 
predictions as to the consequences of the reforms for the ownership and control. However, we find that, while in some 
countries the adoption of a unified takeover code may result in dispersed ownership, in others it may further 
consolidate the blockholder-based system. 
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There are two polar systems of corporate governance: the market-based system and the 
blockholder-based system. The former prevails in the UK, US and the Commonwealth countries, 
and relies on legal rules largely resulting from case law and on the effective legal enforcement of 
shareholder rights. The blockholder-based system of Continental Europe relies on codified law and 
emphasizes rules protecting stakeholders such as creditors and employees. The two systems differ 
not only in terms of the rationale behind their legal rules, but also in terms of their ownership and 
control. Most Continental European companies are characterized by majority or near-majority 
stakes held by one or few investors. In contrast, the Anglo-American system is characterized by 
dispersed equity. The increasing economic globalisation has fuelled the debate on the best 
corporate governance system and the barriers to the development of a single system of corporate 
governance (see e.g. McCahery et al. 2002). 
Although the debate has generated an extensive body of theoretical and empirical work, the 
conclusions remain opaque. There is yet no consensus as to what system of corporate law is the 
best one and whether legal convergence should be encouraged on a global level. A number of 
theoretical studies argue that regulatory and institutional convergence of corporate governance 
practice worldwide is likely, but the studies are in disagreement as to the direction of the 
convergence. In particular, will the Anglo-American model dominate or will a new hybrid model 
emerge? This paper comes up with some predictions as to the evolution of corporate governance 
that is likely to occur through the ongoing reforms of takeover regulation in Europe.  
Takeover regulation constitutes an important element of corporate governance. Not only do 
changes in takeover regulation affect the level of investor protection, the development of capital 
markets and the market for corporate control, but they are also likely to cause changes in 
ownership and control. As such, reforms of takeover regulation constitute an important channel 
through which a corporate governance system can evolve. The paper provides a detailed 
assessment of established and newly introduced takeover rules. We identify and describe the main 
provisions in takeover regulation in 30 European countries and analyze how takeover regulation 
has changed in these countries over the past 15 years. About 150 legal experts throughout Europe 
have contributed to our unique and large database on the changes in corporate governance 
regulation (see the data appendix).We make predictions as to the consequences of the reforms of 
takeover regulation in terms of ownership and control. 
Overall, this paper shows that there is convergence of European takeover regulation 
towards the UK regime. For example, the European countries have agreed that the equal treatment 
rule constitutes a fundamental principle of corporate law. There is also gradual convergence 
towards the adoption of the mandatory bid and squeeze-out rules. The introduction of lower 
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disclosure thresholds for control as well as the abolishment of shares with multiple voting rights, 
while still allowing for the use of non-voting shares, may also suggest that there is convergence 
towards the Anglo-American governance system. However, regulatory changes, which may at first 
sight appear similar across countries, may have totally different effects within their national 
system. While in some countries the adoption of a unified takeover code may disperse ownership, 
in others it may further concentrate ownership. We also conclude that, although the shareholder-
centred view of corporate governance is receiving widespread recognition, some economies seem 
to opt for the blockholder-based system. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses whether there is an optimal 
corporate governance  system and whether the different national systems are likely to converge 
towards it. Section 3 reviews the corporate governance functions of takeover regulation, while 
section 4 predicts the impact of takeover regulation on the evolution of corporate governance. 
Section 5 assesses the possible regulatory mechanisms and their impact on the development of a 
well-functioning M&A market, on the improvement of shareholder protection, and on the 
evolution of ownership and control. Using a unique database on corporate law reforms in 30 
European countries, section 6 documents the dynamics of takeover regulation and predicts the 
consequences of the reforms for the development of corporate governance systems. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. The evolution of corporate governance regulation: the convergence debate 
 
The increasing economic globalisation has fuelled vivid debates on the similarities of and 
differences between national corporate governance systems and the barriers to the development of 
a single system of corporate governance (see e.g. McCahery et al. 2002). The key questions are 
whether a particular national corporate governance system has a competitive advantage over all 
other systems, and if yes, whether other systems ought to move towards it. These are important 
questions as the choice of corporate governance regime has an impact on the availability and cost 
of capital, corporate performance and the distribution of corporate value in a country.1 
 Although there is now an extensive body of studies, their conclusions remain opaque. 
There is as yet no consensus as to the best system of corporate law and whether legal convergence 
should be encouraged on a global level. Some law and economics academics proclaim the 
superiority of the shareholder-oriented corporate governance system, characterized by well-
developed capital markets, the prevalence of institutional investors, good investor protection, a 
                                                 
1 The empirical literature documents that weak corporate governance, combined with weak enforcement of the 
law, distorts the efficient allocation of resources, undermines the ability of companies to compete internationally, and 
hinders investment and economic development.  
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market for corporate control, and a focus on shareholder value. La Porta et al. (1997) argue that 
this system, which exists predominantly in countries with a common law system, ensures a higher 
willingness of investors to provide financing as it aims at guaranteeing shareholders a fair return 
on their investment. In turn, this results in higher company valuations and growth potential (e.g. La 
Porta et al. (2002), Himmelberg et al. (2002)) and more developed and efficient financial markets 
(e.g. La Porta et al. (1997) and Mork et al. (2000)). Similarly, Levine (1998, 1999) shows that 
countries with English legal origin have better prospects in terms of long-run economic growth. 
Despite the widely-held view on the superiority of the Anglo-American system, there are 
also supporters of the alternative systems such as the labour-oriented, state-oriented, and other 
stakeholder-oriented systems, prevailing in countries of German, French, Scandinavian, and Asian 
legal origin. The supporters of these alternative systems argue that the chief advantage of these 
systems lies in the way they address the misalignment of interests between managers and 
shareholders. Whereas in common law countries this problem is resolved via the monitoring by the 
market for corporate control and regulation forcing managers to follow the interests of the 
shareholders, civil law countries mainly rely on large shareholder, creditor or employee 
monitoring.  
Given that the long-term interests of shareholders and stakeholders are not necessarily at 
odds, it is reasonable to expect the two monitoring mechanisms to produce similar outcomes in 
terms of long-term wealth creation. In line with this argument, the empirical literature2 provides 
mixed evidence about the relative merits of the two mechanisms, but still suggests that the 
alternative systems of corporate governance can be as efficient as the ‘superior’ Anglo-American 
system. The lack of consensus regarding the optimal system of corporate governance has 
implications for the current law reforms. It raises the question as to the direction reformers of 
national systems should adopt.  
Hansmann and Kraakman (2000) suggest that the increasing acceptance of a shareholder-
centred ideology of corporate law by international business, governments, and legal elites will be 
translated into corporate law reforms and is likely to result in the convergence of corporate 
governance towards Anglo-American practice. An alternative view is based on the global 
competition hypothesis. It states that the two main competing systems should borrow the best 
practices from one another. This would result in a ‘hybrid model’ with the right mix of market 
discipline, corporate regulation, and power of corporate stakeholders. As an example of such a 
model one may think of the system proposed by the European Commission that is to provide firms 
with the freedom to select the model that best suits their needs (McCahery and Renneboog 2004). 
Bratton and McCahery (2000) have yet another view. They argue that each reform programme 
                                                 
2 For a review of this literature see Becht, Bolton and Röell (2003), Dennis and McConnell (2003). For empirical 
evidence see Rajan and Zingales (1998), Carlin and Mayer (2003), Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (2001). 
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should focus on resolving the weaknesses of its national system, without attempting to change the 
system itself. This implies that worldwide convergence is not necessary.  
Those predicting convergence of corporate governance regimes justify themselves by 
stating that convergence makes sense in terms of economic efficiency. However, others argue that 
economic efficiency may be an insufficient force to bring about convergence and that convergence 
may only be achieved if political and institutional barriers are eliminated. Thus, Roe (2002, 2003) 
and Coffee (2001) suggest that powerful interest and lobby groups are an important barrier to 
convergence. Roe (1991) claims that political constraints lead to a suboptimal system and prevent 
the move towards a more efficient system. Furthermore, Bebchuk and Roe (2000) stress the 
importance of path dependency in terms of the evolution of corporate governance. The initial 
institutional structures3 and their effect on the legal rules governing the corporations4 are two main 
factors that are likely to prevent convergence in practice.  
Nonetheless, even if global convergence is unlikely to occur through changes in regulation 
or other institutional arrangements, Gilson (2000) suggests that there may be contractual 
convergence of best corporate practice. Firms may choose to deviate from the national corporate 
governance standards by opting into another corporate governance regime. This implies 
convergence at the company level rather than at the national (or federal state) level. The incidence 
of such contractual arrangements has significantly increased over the past decade via (i) cross-
listings,5 (ii) a switch of the state of incorporation,6 and (iii) cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions.7 However, if contractual convergence were to take place, it would likely result in a 
‘race-to-the-bottom’. Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) and Bebchuk and Ferrell (2001) show that the 
real reason to incorporate in another state is that companies are attracted to the states that provide 
managers with a wider range of anti-takeover measures. Hence, the competition between states to 
attract incorporations may actually worsen corporate governance. Similar trends may occur as a 
result of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Companies from countries with less friendly 
takeover regimes are less likely to be taken over (and hence have more opportunities to seek target 
                                                 
3 As an example of initial structures Bebchuk and Roe mention ownership. The initial ownership affects ‘the 
identity of the corporate structure of the economy that would be efficient for any given company and, also, gives some 
parties both incentives and power to impede changes’. 
4 The initial ownership affects both the type of corporate rules that will be efficient and the interest group politics 
(lobbying) that can determine which rules will actually be chosen. 
5 Companies opting for an additional listing on another stock exchange have to adopt the listing requirements of 
that stock exchange, which may consist of different accounting standards, disclosure requirements, and governance 
structure (Karolyi (1997), Coffee (2002), Pagano, Röell and Zechner (2003), Licht (1998, 2003)). 
6 Companies may incorporate in countries or states with favourable corporate governance rules. For example, in 
the US, Delaware accounts for almost 60% of all incorporations. According to Daines (2001), a switch to the Delaware 
incorporation has a positive impact on corporate value. 
7 According to international law, when a foreign firm acquires 100% of a domestic firm, the nationality of the 
latter changes. Hence, the target firm usually adopts the accounting standards, disclosure practices, and governance 
structures of the acquiring firm (Bris and Cabolis (2002) and Rossi and Volpin (2003)). 
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companies abroad), whereas companies from countries with relatively friendly takeover regimes 
are more likely to become targets. Since the target usually adopts the acquirer’s governance 
standards, the cross-border market for corporate control may evolve towards a less friendly 
takeover regime: either a blockholder-based regime or a market-based regime with effective 
takeover defences. In turn, this may push countries to adopt takeover regulation resulting in a less 
friendly takeover regime and hence in less efficient market monitoring of managers. 
We conclude that the debate as to the worldwide convergence of corporate governance 
regimes is still ongoing. A growing number of studies predict global convergence of corporate 
governance regimes either via changes in the regulatory and institutional framework or via 
contractual arrangements. However, the predictions of these studies depart substantially from each 
other with respect to the motives for and the direction of convergence. While regulatory and 
institutional convergence may be driven by motives of economic efficiency, contractual 
convergence may be driven by other motives such as managerial entrenchment.  
 
3. The corporate governance functions of takeover regulation 
 
Although takeover regulation is mainly seen as a mechanism to facilitate efficient corporate 
restructuring (Burkart (1999)), it is also an important in terms of mitigating conflicts of interests 
between diverse company constituencies such as management, shareholders, and stakeholders. 
Takeover regulation does not only curb conflicts of interests related to transfers of control, but also 
has a more general impact on the agency problems between management and shareholders, 
minority and majority investors, and other stakeholders. As such, it constitutes an important 
element of a corporate governance system. Its corporate governance role, however, depends on 
other characteristics of the governance system such as ownership and control.  
In a system with dispersed ownership, the primary corporate governance role of takeover 
regulation is to restrain opportunistic managerial behaviour. Small shareholders cannot effectively 
monitor the management due to coordination problems and have to rely on external monitoring via 
the market for corporate control. Hostile takeovers target poorly performing firms and replace 
poorly performing management. The threat of losing their jobs and perquisites provides managers 
with an incentive to focus on shareholder objectives. The role of takeover regulation is then to 
design rules and provide instruments that minimize the costs and inefficiencies associated with the 
(hostile) takeover mechanism8 and thereby facilitate a transfer of control towards more productive 
                                                 
8 However, hostile takeovers may constitute a disruptive and costly mechanism to bring about a change in control 
as the vast majority of the takeovers does not yield the anticipated synergistic value increase (Gregory, 1997; 
Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Ghosh, 2001; Louis, 2004). There is no evidence 
that hostile takeovers are able to create more (long-term) synergistic value than friendly ones and hostile acquisitions 
tend to be more disruptive than friendly ones. Therefore, even in the US and UK where widely-held firms prevail, 
 7
 
owners and management. Examples of measures stimulating takeover activity are the squeeze-out 
rule, the break-through rule, and limitations to the use of takeover defence measures.  
In a system with concentrated ownership, takeover regulation functions as a corporate 
governance device aiming at protecting minority shareholders’ interests. The concentration of 
ownership and control is seen as an alternative mechanism that can mitigate the conflict of 
interests between management and shareholders. Major investors have strong incentives to monitor 
management and replace it in poorly performing companies (Franks, Mayer and Renneboog 2001). 
Bolton and von Thadden (1998) argue that the advantage of monitoring by blockholders is that it 
takes place on an ongoing basis. In contrast, external disciplining only occurs in crisis situations. 
However, the presence of a controlling shareholder is also associated with potential opportunistic 
behaviour towards minority shareholders. Although there are a number of standard company law 
techniques to resolve conflicts between the large shareholder and minority shareholders, takeover 
regulation plays an important role, as it can provide minority shareholders with an ‘exit on fair 
terms’ opportunity. Provisions such as the sell-out right, the mandatory bid rule, or the equal 
treatment principle, ensure such exit opportunities for minority shareholders. 
Specific provisions of takeover regulation apply to control transactions to regulate conflicts 
of interests between the management and shareholders of the target and bidder. Two major agency 
problems may emerge. First, control transfers may turn the target’s incumbent shareholders into 
minority shareholders. Second, the management of the target company may be tempted to 
implement unduly defence measures to obstruct the takeover, even if this clashes with shareholder 
interests. Takeover regulation should aim at minimizing both potential conflicts. In particular, a 
limit on the use of anti-takeover devices is seen as the best way to constrain opportunistic 
managerial behaviour. In addition, the mandatory bid rule and the sell-out right provide the target 
shareholders with a right to exit the company at a fair price.             
Overall, the above discussion suggests that takeover regulation can have a number of 
provisions that perform corporate governance functions both in the case of a transfer of control and 
in terms of governance of ordinary corporate activity. There are, however, three important trade-
offs. First, in countries with dispersed ownership, provisions aiming at providing an exit 
opportunity for target shareholders are likely to discourage the monitoring of managers via the 
market for corporate control and vice versa.9 The opposite nature of the two types of provisions 
                                                                                                                                                                
hostile takeovers are relatively rarely used. Over the 1990s, 239 hostile takeovers were announced in the US and 158 
in the UK. This constitutes 2.3 and 6.5 percent of the total number of announced tender offers, respectively. There 
were only 67 hostile bids in the 14 EU countries (excluding the UK), representing 1.3 percent of all tender offers 
announced during this period (Thomson Financial Securities Data (2004)). In most other countries they are even rarer. 
9 Regulatory provisions that allocate more takeover surplus to the bidding firm increase the bidder’s incentive to 
make a bid to acquire a poorly performing firm and replace its inefficient management upon the acquisition of control. 
However, such provisions may dilute rights of target company’s incumbent shareholders. Takeover provisions that 
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gives rise to a trade-off in regulation: facilitating the market monitoring of managers, and 
providing an exit opportunity for minority shareholders.  
A second trade-off arises with respect to the two main functions of takeover regulation: the 
promotion of efficient corporate restructuring, and the reduction of agency conflicts and the 
protection of minority shareholders. The trade-off is similar to the previous one, but relates to the 
broader definition of corporate restructuring, which apart from the hostile takeover mechanism, 
includes the reallocation of capital to better managers. As such, the second trade-off is equally 
important in countries with dispersed ownership and those with concentrated ownership. Takeover 
regulation also indirectly affects the incentives for a company to seek a listing on the stock 
exchange. If the incumbent owners value control, they will often be reluctant to take their firm 
public if this exposes them to an active market for corporate control. Their reluctance to take their 
firm public depends on the distribution of gains from a future takeover bid, which is determined by 
takeover regulation. Furthermore, regulation that is likely to reduce the power of the blockholders 
discourages a listing. This constitutes a third trade-off of the regulation: promoting the expansion 
of financial markets, and supplying corporate governance devices aimed at protecting the rights of 
corporate constituencies. 
No clear guidelines are available as to how the above trade-offs should be made. The way 
the trade-offs are made critically depends on the broader (national) corporate governance 
framework and the economic and political objectives of national regulators.    
 
4. Reforms of takeover regulation and corporate governance convergence 
 
As takeover regulation is an important corporate governance device, any attempts to 
change its provisions have a significant impact on the wider corporate governance system. Not 
only do changes in takeover regulation affect the level of investor protection and the development 
of a country’s takeover market, but they may also bring about changes in ownership and control. 
As such, takeover regulation reforms provide an important channel for a corporate governance 
system to evolve. It would be misleading to conclude that the harmonization of takeover regulation 
across countries will lead to global convergence of corporate governance regimes as the corporate 
governance functions of takeover regulation depend on the degree of ownership and control 
concentration.  
Takeover regulation reforms, which focus on the conflict of interests between management 
and shareholders, are likely to improve investor protection. Depending on the provisions 
introduced by the regulation, the reforms either improve the efficiency of the external monitoring 
                                                                                                                                                                
provide exit opportunities for minority shareholders redistribute the takeover surplus from the bidder to the target 
shareholders and hence make a takeover bid less attractive for the former. 
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by the market for corporate control, or restrict managerial decision power with respect to the use of 
anti-takeover devices. Since both types of provisions force managers to satisfy the interests of the 
shareholders, shareholder protection is expected to improve, should these provisions be adopted. 
La Porta et al. (1999) argue that better protection increases shareholders’ confidence and hence 
their willingness to invest, which encourages a more dispersed ownership structure.     
Regulatory reforms that introduce exit opportunities for minority shareholders reduce the 
private benefits of control that the controlling blockholder can exploit at the detriment of these 
minority shareholders. This improves the protection of the latter. Low private benefits of control 
can be regarded as a requirement for ownership dispersion, as they reduce the incentives to hold a 
controlling block. However, regulatory provisions that reduce the private benefits of control may 
discourage not only holding controlling blocks of ownership, but also efficient corporate 
restructuring as private gains to a bidder are often an incentive for a takeover bid. As a result, 
control may remain in the hands of inefficient blockholders. Hence, the effect of such reforms may 
result in either the upholding of the existing concentrated ownership and control or in a shift from 
dispersed to concentrated shareholdings.   
An increase in investor protection or a decrease in private benefits of control alone may be 
insufficient to induce changes in ownership. Bebchuk (1999) shows that, in the presence of large 
private benefits of control and a well-functioning takeover market, ownership is unlikely to 
become more dispersed. Since a third party acquiring a controlling block is unable to compensate 
the incumbent blockholder for the private benefits of control the latter enjoys, it is unlikely that the 
incumbent ever accepts a bid. Thus, where private benefits of control are high, regulatory reforms 
aimed at improving investor protection are likely to reinforce the existing ownership structure. Roe 
(2002) proposes an alternative scenario. In his view, if the costs of monitoring management are 
high, the development of a well-functioning market for corporate control may lead to a shift from 
concentrated to dispersed ownership. An active takeover market incorporates the costs of potential 
agency costs caused by high managerial discretion by providing efficient external monitoring, and 
thus reducing the need for large-shareholder monitoring. This shift towards widely-held ownership 
may be further supported by other drawbacks of large share blocks such as the costs from low 
liquidity and undiversified risk. We conclude that takeover regulation reforms that enhance 
investor protection are likely to lead towards more dispersed ownership provided that private 
benefits of control are relatively low. It also follows from Bebchuk (1999) and Roe (2002) that, 
when investor protection is already high, reforms aiming at reducing private benefits of control 
may bring about ownership dispersion. However, if management has substantial discretion to 
apply anti-takeover measures, the preferred ownership distribution may shift towards a more 





Table 1. Reforms of takeover regulation and their expected impact on ownership and control within a particular 
corporate governance system 
 
Initial characteristics of the system  Takeover regulation reforms Expected effect on the 
ownership structure 
Low investor protection  
(High managerial discretion) 
Decrease in private benefits of control  Remains concentrated  
High investor protection 
(Effective external monitoring of managers) 
Decrease in private benefits of control  More dispersed  
Low private benefits of control Improve investor protection  More dispersed  
High private benefits of control Improve investor protection  Remains concentrated 
 
  The European Commission tried to establish a global level-playing field for a takeover 
market. However, the adoption of such a unified takeover code by countries with different initial 
settings may disperse ownership in some of them, but may further consolidate the blockholder-
based system in others. Since the blockholder-based system lacks a market for corporate control, 
any further reinforcement of this system caused by the takeover law harmonization may disable the 
attempts to establish such an international level-playing field.10 
 
5.  Devices of takeover regulation 
As discussed in section 3, takeover regulation should ensure a well-functioning market for 
corporate control and protect the interests of minority shareholders and other types of stakeholders. 
The regulatory devices available to achieve these two aims are manifold and comprise: (i) the 
mandatory bid rule, (ii) the principle of equal treatment of shareholders, (iii) ownership and control 
transparency, (iv) squeeze-out and sell-out rules, (v) the one-share-one-vote principle, (vi) the 
break-through rule, and (vii) board neutrality with respect to anti-takeover measures. This section 
discusses the role of each device as well as its potential consequences for the ownership structure. 
Table 2 summarizes the conjectures presented below.  
 
5.1 The mandatory bid rule 
 
 The mandatory bid rule provides the minority shareholders with an opportunity to exit the 
company on fair terms. The rule requires the acquirer to make a tender offer to all the shareholders 
once she has accumulated a certain percentage of the shares. Whereas about a decade ago, a tender 
offer on all shares outstanding was only mandatory after an investor had acquired de facto majority 
                                                 
10 For more details on this issue, see Becht (2003) 
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control, nowadays thresholds are substantially lower. For instance, there has been a decrease in the 
thresholds in Denmark and Italy. In these countries, a tender offer needs to be made to all the 
remaining shareholders as soon as the bidder has accumulated one third of the company’s equity. 
The mandatory bid rule usually also dictates the price of the tender offer.  Depending on the 
national regulation, the price must not be lower than the highest price paid for the shares already 
acquired by the bidder or must not be lower than a certain percentage of the average share price of 
the previous 12 months (e.g. 75%). The mandatory bid requirement is justified on the grounds that 
an investor, who obtains control, may be tempted to exploit private benefits of control at the 
expense of the minority shareholders. As such, the role of the mandatory bid rule in takeover 
regulation is to protect the minority shareholders by providing them with the opportunity to exit at 
a fair price.  
Although the mandatory bid requirement may mitigate the problem of expropriation of 
minority shareholders, it also decreases the likelihood of value-creating restructuring. The main 
reason for this is that the rule makes control transactions more expensive and thereby discourages 
bidders from making a bid in the first place. There are several ways to reduce these costs. First, the 
costs can be reduced by increasing the threshold above which the acquirer has to make a 
mandatory offer. Second, the costs can be reduced by allowing the price in the tender offer to be 
lower than the highest price paid for any of the shares previously accumulated. Third, they can be 
reduced by granting further exceptions to the rule rather than just for financial distress of the 
target. However, any of the suggested modifications to the rule increase the likelihood that 
minority shareholders are expropriated and violate the equal treatment principle of corporate law.  
Introducing a mandatory bid rule has some implications for the ownership and control 
structure in a blockholder system. First, it makes the blockholder system less efficient, as it 
reduces the trade in controlling blocks which is the dominant way to transfer control in this system 
(Köke and Renneboog, 2004). Consequently, control may remain in the hands of inefficient 
blockholders. Second, it restricts the size of the stake a blockholder is allowed to acquire without 
triggering a tender offer. Third, the higher the bid price in a mandatory tender offer, the lower is 
the acquirer’s incentive to make a bid such that ownership and control in the blockholder system is 
likely to remain concentrated. 
In contrast to the blockholder system, the shareholder-oriented system with its dispersed 
ownership structure is almost unaffected by the introduction of the mandatory bid rule. Although 
the requirement to make a tender offer may reduce the intensity of M&A activity and hence 





5.2 The principle of equal treatment  
 
While the principle of equal treatment constitutes an important principle of corporate 
governance regulation, it is particularly important in takeover regulation where the possibilities of 
violations of the rights of minority shareholders are far-reaching. The principle requires controlling 
shareholders, the management, and other constituencies to treat all shareholders within each 
individual class of shares equally. The equal treatment requirement became a fundamental 
principle in almost all Western European countries prior the 1990s. During the 1990s, it was 
introduced in Switzerland11 as well as in Central and Eastern European countries.12 
 The equal treatment principle requires an acquirer to offer minority shareholders to exit on 
terms that are no less favourable than those offered to the shareholders who sold a controlling 
block. Overall, the role of the equal treatment principle in takeover regulation is similar to the 
mandatory bid rule as both aim at protecting minority shareholders.  
 The adoption of the principle of equal treatment substantially affects the blockholder 
system, but has virtually no effect on the market-based system. In target companies with 
concentrated ownership, an acquirer usually has to offer a control premium to the incumbent 
blockholder reflecting the potential private benefits of control. If there is a mandatory bid 
requirement, the bidder has to repurchase the remaining shares at a price no less that the one she 
paid for the controlling block. Therefore, the combination of the mandatory bid and the equal 
treatment principle increases the costs of an acquisition and decreases the price that a bidder is able 
to offer to the controlling shareholder (Davies and Hopt, 2004). This discourages the incentives to 
make a bid, as well as the incentives for incumbent blockholders to accept one. Consequently, the 
equal treatment principle is an additional barrier to a well-functioning market for corporate control 
in a blockholder-based governance regime.13 Nonetheless, the equal treatment principle may cause 
a shift towards more dispersed ownership, as it discourages the accumulation of controlling share 
                                                 
11 Until 1992, the principle was unwritten, but generally recognized at the level of company law. As from the 
1992-revision, it was incorporated in the law (art. 717 sec. 2 CO) in a qualified manner, providing for equal treatment 
under equal circumstances. Although the principle refers to the treatment of shareholders by the board of directors, it is 
recognized as a general principle. At the level of stock exchange regulations, takeover offers have had to comply with 
the principle of equal treatment of shareholders (art. 24 sec. 2 SESTA) since 1998. 
12 For example, in Bulgaria, the principle is contained in Art.181, Para. 3 of the Trade Act of 2000. In Cyprus, 
Section 69A of the Companies Law introduced in 2003 states that: “the shareholders of a class of shares of a public 
company shall be equally treated by the company”. In the Czech Republic, it was introduced in 2001 (§ 155/7 of the 
Commercial Code).. 
13 It is only in the absence of large private benefits of control that private negotiations with the incumbent 
controlling blockholder are likely to result in lower costs for a control transfer than an open market purchase from 
dispersed shareholders (Bagnoli and Lipman (1988), Holmström and Nalebuff (1990), and Burkart, Gromb, and 
Panunzi (1997)). The presence of controlling shareholders in companies may then facilitate an active market for 
corporate control.  
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blocks in the long run. Conversely, Bebchuk (1999) predicts that concentrated ownership will 
prevail, especially when the principle of equal treatment is not enshrined in corporate law. 
 
5.3 Transparency of ownership and control 
 
 An important element of corporate governance consists in the disclosure of voting and cash 
flow rights. In all Western countries, the disclosure regulation relates to voting rights rather than 
cash flow rights (see the country studies in Barca and Becht (2001)).Virtually all of these countries 
have recently lowered the thresholds above which the ownership of control rights need to be 
disclosed. In some countries, the ‘strategic intent’ or the purpose for which the share stake was 
acquired also has to be disclosed. Thus, in the early 1990s, the average threshold for disclosure in 
Western Europe and Scandinavia was about 9 percent, with the UK having the lowest threshold (3 
percent), and Germany the highest threshold (25 percent). In countries such as Italy and Sweden, a 
mandatory disclosure of voting rights was introduced for the first time as late as 1992. By 2004, 
the average threshold was reduced to 5 percent with the lowest threshold of 2 percent in Italy and 
the highest one of 10 percent in Luxembourg and Sweden. Information about major share blocks 
allows the regulator, minority shareholders and the market to monitor large blockholders in order 
to avoid that the latter extract private benefits of control at the expense of other stakeholders. In 
other words, transparency minimizes potential agency problems ex ante. Moreover, transparency 
allows the regulator to investigate, for instance, insider trading or self-dealing by large 
blockholders.  
 Conversely, a higher threshold for the mandatory control disclosure improves the 
efficiency of the hostile takeover mechanism (Grossman and Hart, 1980). Bidders can make 
substantial profits on the toehold stake they built up prior to reaching the disclosure threshold. The 
disclosure of the acquisition of a major stake may alert the market that a bid is likely to take place. 
This will lead to a revision of the share price that may then reflect the likely gains from the 
takeover. The higher the thresholds for the ownership disclosure and the mandatory bid, the lower 
is the number of shares for which the bidder pays the full takeover premium. Conversely, lowering 
the disclosure and mandatory bid thresholds will cause a fraction of potential takeovers not to be 
undertaken.14  
 However, a decrease in the disclosure threshold is unlikely to have a substantial impact on 
control. On the one hand, lowering the disclosure threshold reduces the bidder’s incentives to 
make a bid, which may lead to less efficient external monitoring of management. On the other 
hand, a lower threshold enhances the disclosure of information and hence positively affects 
                                                 
14  See e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Hirshleifer and Titman (1990), Kyle and Vila (1991), and Burkart (1999). 
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investor protection. As it is unclear which effect dominates, the impact of a tightening of control 
disclosure on the shareholding structure is ambiguous.          
 
5.4 The squeeze-out and sell-out rules 
 
 The squeeze-out rule gives the controlling shareholder the right to force minority 
shareholders, who hold out in a tender offer, to sell their shares to the bidder at or below the tender 
offer price (Boehmer (2002), and Becht, Bolton and Röell (2003)). The squeeze-out rule only kicks 
in, if the bidder has acquired a specific percentage of the equity, usually 90%.15 The rule allows the 
bidder to obtain 100% of the equity and frees him from having to deal with minority shareholders. 
The squeeze-out rule affects the behaviour of the target shareholders during a tender offer as it 
reduces the hold-out problem and may lead to a decrease in the tender price.16 According to 
Yarrow (1985) and Maug (2004), the economic efficiency of the squeeze-out rule depends on how 
the price at which the minority shares are squeezed out is determined. For example, Maug’s model 
predicts that economic efficiency worsens if minority shareholders extract higher premiums in 
squeeze-outs. If these premiums are higher than those offered in the tender offer, then few will be 
tempted to tender in the first place. 
 The sell-out rule is another provision aiming at protecting the remaining minority 
shareholders who have the right to demand the controlling shareholder to buy their shares at a fair 
price. The rule reduces the pressure on the target shareholders to tender. As a consequence, this 
rule has a negative impact on the likelihood of acquisitions occurring. Although the sell-out rule is 
seen as a counter-provision to the squeeze-out rule, the two rules are used jointly in many 
jurisdictions. The proposed European Takeover Directive contains both the squeeze-out and sell-
out rights.  
 Summarizing the above discussion, the squeeze-out rule mitigates potential free-riding 
behaviour by small shareholders, thereby allocating more of the takeover gains to the bidder. In 
addition, the rule eliminates the potential problems that may arise between the controlling 
shareholder and the remaining minority shareholders after most of the target’s shares have been 
acquired. Hence, the squeeze-out rule is expected to facilitate takeovers and its introduction may 
have a positive impact on the development of a takeover market. In contrast, the sell-out rule 
                                                 
15 Across countries, there is some variation in the threshold above which the bidder can squeeze out the remaining 
minority shareholders. Ireland has the lowest threshold of 80 percent. The usual threshold in Western European 
countries is 90 percent, while Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands impose the highest threshold, 95 
percent. However, 95 percent became the highest threshold only in 1998 when Italy and Switzerland reduced their 
squeeze-out threshold from 98 to 90 percent. 
16 When a bid is conditional on the squeeze-out threshold, shareholders cannot gain from retaining shares. Hence, 
they are willing to tender at prices below post-takeover minority share value. Therefore, bidders who condition their 
bid on a squeeze-out threshold should earn higher returns. 
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reduces the share of takeover gains allocated to the bidder, thereby discouraging some value-
creating takeovers. The rule is aimed at protecting minority shareholders. Like the squeeze-out 
rule, the sell-out right also eliminates potential conflicts between the majority shareholder and the 
minority shareholders. The adoption of the two rules may reduce the incentives of holding 
controlling blocks and may thus reduce ownership concentration in the long run.      
 
5.5 The one-share-one-vote principle 
 
 The one-share-one-vote principle speaks against any arrangements restricting voting rights. 
Dual-class shares with multiple voting rights, non-voting shares and voting caps are forbidden if 
this legal principle is upheld. The issue of dual class shares or non-voting shares allows some 
shareholders to accumulate control while limiting their cash investment. Another way to deviate 
from the one-share-one-vote principle is via pyramids of control. The use of intermediate holding 
companies allows the investor at the top of the pyramid − the ultimate shareholder − to have 
control with reduced cash flow rights. Renneboog (2000) and Köke (2004) show that for Belgium 
and Germany, respectively, it is the ultimate shareholder rather than direct shareholders who 
monitors the firm and exercises control.  
 The potential benefit from introducing differentiated voting rights is that more firms may 
seek a stock exchange listing. Company owners who value control are often reluctant to take their 
firm public if they risk losing control in the process. A deviation from the one-share-one-vote rule 
allows them to minimize the risk of losing control. Hart (1988) argues that a deviation from the 
one-share-one-vote principle is unlikely to hurt minority shareholders as the lack of control rights 
is compensated by the lower offer price at the flotation.  
 Becht, Bolton and Röell (2003) review the theoretical literature which addresses whether 
deviations from the one-share-one-vote rule improve the efficiency of the takeover mechanism. 
Grossman and Hart (1988) show that, if shareholdings are dispersed, the one-share-one-vote rule 
ensures a socially efficient outcome of a takeover bid because it enables the bidder who values the 
target the most to gain control. Furthermore, deviations from the rule may harm the development 
of a market for corporate control. First, given that differentiated voting rights facilitate the control 
by a few owners, this makes a takeover virtually impossible without a break-through rule (see sub-
section 5.6). Second, although violations to the one-share-one-vote rule such as voting agreements 
can curb the power of the controlling shareholder and provide greater protection to minority 
shareholders, they may also increase managerial discretion and discourage potential value-
increasing takeovers (Crespi and Renneboog, 2003). Third, voting restrictions such as voting caps 
represent important anti-takeover devices that discourage potential bidders from making an offer. 
However, such voting restrictions provide greater protection to minority shareholders.  
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 Preventing deviations from the one-share-one-vote principle has a two-fold effect on 
ownership and control. First, it eliminates barriers to the takeover market, and therefore protects 
investors against opportunistic managerial behaviour. This may translate into a greater willingness 
of small investors to participate in equity financing which leads to a more dispersed shareholding 
structure. Thus, the one-share-one-vote rule may be an important corporate governance device, 
especially for firms with a dispersed ownership structure. Second, a reform that bans deviations 
from the rule reduces minority shareholder protection, increases the potential private gains of 
control and encourages ownership concentration. Thus, the impact of the introduction of the one-
share-one-vote principle to the blockholder system is still ambiguous, as it depends whether the 
effect from the protection against opportunistic behaviour of incumbent managers or that from the 
reduced shareholder protection resulting from the abolition of voting caps dominates.  
 
5.6 The break-through rule 
 
 The effects of a violation of the one-share-one-vote principle via dual class shares, non-
voting shares or voting caps, can be undone if corporate law allows for a break-through rule. This 
rule enables a bidder who has accumulated a given fraction of the equity, to break through the 
company’s existing voting arrangements and exercise control as if the one-share-one-vote principle 
were upheld. For example, a recently acquired block consisting of a majority of non-voting rights 
may be converted into a voting majority by means of the break-through rule. The rule facilitates 
corporate restructuring as it allows the bidder to bypass anti-takeover devices and redistributes the 
takeover gains from the incumbent shareholders to the bidder.17 Thus, the break-through rule 
makes transfers of control feasible that would otherwise have been made impossible due to the 
opposition by a target shareholder holding a majority of voting shares. 
 However, the break-through rule also has some major disadvantages. First, there is 
inconsistency between the break-through rule and the mandatory bid rule. The break-through rule 
gives control by circumventing the provisions in the articles of association rather than by acquiring 
a certain percentage of voting shares. As such, the break-through rule violates the principle of 
shareholder decision-making. Second, in addition to making value-increasing takeover bids 
possible, the break-through rule also facilitates takeover attempts by inefficient bidders who would 
otherwise be discouraged by the mandatory bid requirement. Third, the rule not only makes 
                                                 
17 Berglöf and Burkart (2003) argue that the break-through rule reduces the costs associated with the acquisition of 
all minority shares as imposed by the mandatory bid rule. They compare the takeover price that a bidder is expected to 
pay in order to acquire 100% of the company’s equity under two scenarios: (1) the case of a negotiated block trade 
with an incumbent shareholder and a subsequent mandatory bid, and (2) the case of a direct tender offer to non-
controlling shareholders (bypassing the incumbent shareholder controlling a majority of the voting rights) with the 
subsequent application of the break-through rule. They show that the break-through rule reduces the acquisition costs 
compared to a negotiated block trade followed by a mandatory bid. 
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inefficient acquisitions possible, but also frustrates attempts by the incumbent shareholders to 
prevent such bids. Finally, the main concern is that the break-through rule will induce the creation 
of even more complex pyramids and cross-holdings (Bebchuk and Hart, 2002). The reason is that 
such voting structures are not covered by the break-through rule which only targets voting caps, 
non-voting shares and multiple-voting shares. Technically, shifts towards pyramidal ownership 
structures could disable most of the advantages of the break-through rule.  
 The direct effect of the break-through rule within the blockholder-based system is the 
decrease in the costs of successful bids. This decrease promotes takeover activity and facilitates 
transfers of control. However, Berglöf and Burkart (2003) argue that the rule fundamentally alters 
the initial contracts of the controlling owners resulting in uncertainty about property rights, and 
thus reducing the incentives of the controlling owners to invest in corporate governance actions. 
The rule also eliminates their veto over transfers of control and reduces their prospects of getting 
compensated for their private benefits of control. Overall, this suggests that the introduction of the 
rule should eventually increase ownership dispersion. However, as argued above, the emergence of 
more complex control structures such as pyramids and cross-shareholdings to circumvent the 
breakthrough rule may reinforce the blockholder model. Therefore, we conclude that the long-run 
impact of the break-through rule on ownership is unclear as it depends on the blockholders’ ability 
to build up share stakes via pyramids. 
  
5.7  Board neutrality and anti-takeover measures 
 
 Although the takeover market is considered to be an external corporate governance 
mechanism that forces managers to act in the interests of the shareholders, it can also be a source 
of even greater divergence of interests between these two parties. In the wake of a takeover threat, 
the management of the target company potentially faces two a conflict of interests: the transaction 
may create shareholder value, but also endangers their jobs and perquisites. If the management of 
the target firm has unrestricted power, the line of actions chosen may focus on their own interests 
and hence on the prevention of a takeover. This calls for a set of rules that govern the behaviour of 
management and shareholders when a takeover offer is imminent. The rules deal with the issues of 
who decides whether to reject or accept the offer, the adoption of takeover defences and the 
bargaining strategy with the bidder. The rules mainly apply to widely-held companies where the 
problem of managerial discretion is especially pronounced.   
 There are two solutions for mitigating the managerial agency problem in a takeover context 
(Davies and Hopt (2004)). The first is to transfer the decision as to the acceptance of a bid to the 
shareholders of the target company and to remove it from the management. Unless the regulator 
forbids this, the management can only influence the decision by taking actions that discourage 
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potential bidders from making an offer in the first place or by prolonging the offer process. 
Examples of such actions are the attempt to make the company less attractive to a potential bidder, 
the advice to the target shareholders to reject the bid, and the search for a white knight.  
 Currently, several jurisdictions impose board neutrality with respect to takeover offers, 
preventing the board of directors from taking actions that may frustrate a potential bid. For 
example, the use of poison pills is forbidden in most European countries. The main argument in 
favour of board neutrality is that it limits the potential coercive effect of a bid (Bebchuk (2002), 
Arlen and Talley (2003)). In most jurisdictions, the board should indeed remain neutral and limit 
the use of anti-takeover devices unless an anti-takeover strategy was approved by the shareholders 
at a general meeting and only once a bid has been made.18  
 The second solution is to provide the board with substantial decision power, but to give the 
shareholders the possibility to veto its decisions. The board has then the right to negotiate with a 
bidder on behalf of the shareholders. This arrangement mitigates the coordination problem 
between small shareholders in case of dispersed ownership and the agency problems of other 
stakeholders such as the employees. In a second stage, the shareholders are asked to approve or 
reject the managerial advice. Although this arrangement gives more flexibility to the target 
management to act against potentially undesired bids by setting up an anticipatory anti-takeover 
strategy, there is also more opportunity for the managers to pursue their own interests. Therefore, 
additional corporate governance devices should be introduced, such as the strengthening of the 
independence of the non-executive directors, and the use of executive compensation contracts that 
align managerial interests with those of the shareholders. 
The first solution effectively addresses the potential agency problems between shareholders 
and management of the target in the wake of a takeover. However, its weakness is that the 
defensive tactics can only be applied once a bid has been received and not prior to receiving a bid. 
In contrast, the second solution provides management with the flexibility to prevent value-
destroying takeovers ex ante. However, this mechanism may increase the agency problem between 
management and shareholders. Both solutions are applied in the real world. The first one is used 
mainly in the UK and in most of Continental Europe, whereas the second one is applied in the US 
and some European countries such as the Netherlands. Germany has opted for a mix of the two.   
 The two solutions have implications not only in terms of the relative importance of agency 
problems and the development of the market for corporate control, but also in terms of ownership. 
Roe (2002) predicts that, under the second solution, ownership may become more concentrated as 
management has substantial discretion to apply anti-takeover measures and costs associated with 
                                                 
18 Where ownership and control are concentrated, if the law requires the approval of a defensive measure by a 
majority of shareholders at the AGM, a controlling shareholder can easily oppose any takeover attempt. Therefore, it is 
important to allow for deviations from the one-share-one-vote rule in favour of the minority shareholders when the 
adoption of defensive measures is up for a vote. 
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managerial discretion are high. If ownership is concentrated, the first solution may encourage 
better minority shareholder protection as it reduces the power of the managers acting in the 
interests of the large blockholder. In this case, ownership is likely to become more dispersed. 
However, this may be true only if the voting power of the controlling blockholder is also restricted. 
Otherwise, ownership will become even more entrenched in the hands of the controlling 




Table 2. Expected consequences of takeover regulation reform (summary of the conjectures discussed in section 5) 
 
Concentrated ownership structure Dispersed ownership structure  Elements of Takeover regulation 
Impact on 
M&A activity 





















Fewer M&As Better protection No impact 
1.1 Lower mandatory bid threshold Fewer M&As Better protection More 
dispersion 
Fewer M&As Better protection No impact 
1.2 Higher price at which the bid should be made Fewer M&As 
 
Better protection Ambiguous Fewer M&As Better protection  No impact 
1.3 No equal treatment requirement More M&As 














1.4 Equal treatment requirement (in the presence of 
high private benefits of control) 
Fewer M&As Better protection Ambiguous 
(more 
dispersion) 
No impact Better protection No impact 
1.5 Equal treatment requirement (in case of low 
private benefits of control) 
More M&As No impact More 
dispersion 
No impact No impact No impact 




No impact No impact No impact 
3 Ownership and control transparency 
(Lower disclosure threshold) 
Fewer M&As Better ex-ante 
protection  
Ambiguous Fewer M&As Better ex-ante 
protection  
Ambiguous 
4 The Squeeze-out Rule More M&As Better protection More 
dispersion 
More M&As Better protection No impact 




Fewer M&As Better protection No impact 
6 Ban on the deviation from the  
One share/One vote principle 
More M&As  Ambiguous  
(Less protection) 
Ambiguous More M&As Ambiguous 
(Less protection) 
No impact 
7 Breakthrough rule More M&As  Less protection 
 
Ambiguous More M&As  Less protection Ambiguous 
8 Management neutrality and limitations on 
anti-takeover measures: 
More M&As  Ambiguous  
(Better protection) 
Ambiguous More M&As Ambiguous 
(Less protection) 
No impact 
8.1 Management is decision-taker, anti-takeover 
devices can be installed only when a bid occurs 
More M&As  Ambiguous Ambiguous More M&As  Less protection No impact 
8.2 Management is decision-maker, anti-takeover 
devices can be installed prior a bid occurs 
Fewer M&As Ambiguous Ambiguous Fewer M&As Better protection  More 
concentration  
6.  Reforms of takeover regulation in Europe over the period of 1990-2004 
 
 The history of takeover regulation in Europe goes back to 1968 when the UK introduced a 
voluntary code, the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers in response to a series of large takeovers. 
Since then, the Code has been frequently amended. The two main provisions of the City Code are a 
mandatory bid rule with a threshold of 30 percent beyond which a tender offer becomes 
compulsory, and the prohibition to discriminate against certain shareholders. Other important 
provisions concern the actions of the bidder prior to the bid announcement, the information about 
the bid issued to the target shareholders, and the defensive measures available to the target. The 
Code also stipulates managerial neutrality as it prohibits management to take any actions against a 
takeover without shareholder consent.  
Takeover regulation in Continental Europe was only put in place during the late 1980s 
following a dramatic increase in takeover activity. Many Continental European jurisdictions used 
the British City Code as a benchmark (Hopt (2002), and Berglöf and Burkart (2003)). Initially, 
Continental Europe came up with voluntary codes which were replaced by binding rules in the 
mid-1990s. However, even to date some countries have purely voluntary codes in place. In the late 
1990s, there was a new wave of reforms in response to the fifth takeover wave. A third of these 
takeovers were cross-border transactions. The European Commission set up the High Level Group 
of Company Law Experts headed by Professor Jaap Winter to make recommendations on the 
harmonization of European corporate law, and takeover regulation in particular. In 2002, the 
Commission presented the first draft of the Takeover Directive based on the recommendations of 
the Group. This draft focused on the introduction of five provisions regarding: (i) a mandatory bid 
rule, (ii) the principle of equal treatment of shareholders, (iii) a squeeze-out rule and sell-out right, 
(iv) the principle of board neutrality, and (v) a break-through rule. The fifth provision of the 
proposed Directive met with substantial opposition from EU member states and was not approved.  
While the European Commission attempted to harmonize takeover regulation at the 
European level, most member countries were already engaged in reforming their national takeover 
legislation. The dynamics of the European takeover reforms are presented in Figures 3 to 10. We 
classify all countries into six groups according to their legal origin and economic development, 
following La Porta et al. (1997). Countries from the former communist block are classified 
according to their (staged) accession to the European Union, as this event has probably an 
important impact on their legislative reforms. Figures 1 and 2 show an overview of the ultimate 
control in European countries in the late 1990s.19 Since major takeover regulation reforms took 
                                                 
19 Faccio and Lang (2002) argue that the ownership and control structure in Western countries was relatively 
stable over the 1990s. Hence, the ownership and control structures in Figures 1 and 2 are also representative for the 
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place in the late 1990s, we predict how these ownership patterns may evolve as a result of the 
reforms. 
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Figure 1. Percentage of listed companies under majority  Figure 2. Percentage of listed companies with a blocking  
control      minority of at least 25%  
 
Data source: Faccio and Lang (2002) for the countries with law of English, German, French, and Scandinavian origin, the ECGI 
project “Corporate Governance & Disclosure in the Accession Process”(2001) for the EU accession countries. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show that the blockholder-based regime prevails in most of Continental 
Europe and is characterized by majority or near-majority holdings of stock held in the hands of 
one, two, or a small group of investors. In contrast, the market-based system, which is found in the 
UK and the Republic of Ireland, is characterized by dispersed equity. Although the difference in 
ownership between Continental Europe and the UK-Ireland is remarkable, there is also some 
variation in the percentage of companies under majority or blocking minority control across the 
Continental European countries. Thus, Figure 1 shows that countries of Scandinavian legal origin 
have the lowest percentage of companies controlled by a majority blockholder whereas countries 
of German legal origin and recent EU accession countries (except for Slovenia) have the highest 
percentage. The percentage varies from just above 10 percent in Slovenia to more than 60 percent 
in Estonia and Latvia. Figure 2 reports that the percentage of Continental European companies 
controlled by investors with blocking minorities of at least 25 percent is very high. The difference 
across countries is less pronounced though, as in almost all more than 50 percent of listed 
companies have a controlling blockholder. As discussed in sections 3 and 4, the effects of the 
                                                                                                                                                                
early and mid 1990s. However, this is not a valid statement for the recent EU accession countries, which experienced a 
wave of privatisations in the early 1990s.  
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reforms and their effectiveness may be different in each country given the differences in control. 
However, different patterns of voting power also imply that different types of takeover provisions 
are likely to be introduced in the takeover law.               
Figure 3 shows that the mandatory bid rule had been widely adopted across the different 
groups of countries by 2004. Resistance towards the rule remains in countries of Scandinavian 
(e.g. Sweden) and French (e.g. Luxembourg and the Netherlands) legal origin. Amongst the 
countries that became EU members in 2004, only Cyprus did not adopt it. All three candidates 
earmarked for EU membership in 2007 – Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania – have already adopted 
the rule. Despite the widespread adoption of the rule, its settings vary substantially across the 
countries both with respect to the threshold and the price at which the offer must be made. The 
threshold varies between 20 percent and two-thirds of the voting capital, with the majority of 
countries having a threshold of one-third of the voting rights. However, a number of countries have 
not specified a threshold and instead require a mandatory bid as soon as control has been obtained. 
Moreover, Switzerland20 allows shareholders of a potential target to choose whether to apply the 
mandatory bid rule or not. The rules on the fixing of the price in the mandatory offer also differ 
across jurisdictions. For example, the UK21 and Germany22 require the price to be equal to the 
highest price paid for pre-bid purchases. Other jurisdictions have opted for a more flexible 
approach. In Italy, the price has to be equal to the average market price over the 12 months prior 
the bid announcement23 whereas in Switzerland is has to be at 75 percent of the highest pre-bid 
market price.24 
                                                 
20 Art. 22(2) and 32(1) Loi sur les bourses. However, to use this option companies need to mention this option 
explicitly in the company’s articles of incorporation. 
21 Rule 9.5, 6, and 11 City Code. 
22 Par. 4 Übernahmegesetz – Angebotsverordnung and Par. 31 Übernahmegesetz. 
23 Art. 106(2) Legislative Decree 58. 
24 Art. 32(4) Loi sur les bourses. 
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Figure 3. Adoption of the mandatory bid rule Figure 4. Adoption of the equal treatment principle 
 
Notes: Countries are grouped according to their legal origin following the classification by La Porta et al. (1997) and according to 
the EU enlargement process. Countries are grouped as follows: English legal origin (Republic of Ireland and the UK), German 
legal origin (Switzerland, Austria, Germany), French legal origin (Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, France), Scandinavian legal 
origin (Norway, Sweden, Finland), 2004 EU Accession (Slovenia, Hungary, Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Estonia, 
Latvia), 2007 likely EU Accession (Bulgaria, Romania). Ownership refers to ultimate ownership. The Y-axis shows the percentage 
of countries in each group that have adopted this rule. Data source: Faccio and Lang (2002) for the countries with law of English, 
German, French, and Scandinavian origin, the ECGI project “Corporate Governance & Disclosure in the Accession 
Process”(2001) for the EU accession countries. Martynova and Renneboog (2004) corporate governance database.25 
 
In contrast to the diversity in terms of the adoption and provisions of the mandatory rule, 
Figure 4 reports that there is widespread consensus in Europe with respect to the principle of equal 
treatment of shareholders. In the US, there is no such consensus at the state level. Davies and Hopt 
(2004) report that two-tier offers, which violate the equal-treatment requirement, ‘do not offend the 
provisions of the Williams Act in the US’.26 The equal treatment requirement had already been 
adopted as a fundamental principle by almost all the Western European countries prior to the 
                                                 
25 The Martynova-Renneboog (2004) database is described in the Appendix. 
26 The Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78a, prohibits first-come, first-served offers but not two-tier tender offers. The 
latter involve two parts: in the first tier offer, the bidder pays a premium above the market price for a controlling block, 
whereas in the second tier, the terms are much less favourable. Although this system mitigates the shareholders’ hold-
out problem in a tender offer and hence stimulates the takeover market, it also pushes shareholders to tender even if 
they believe the bid is inadequate. To resolve this problem, US companies resort to poison pills (Subramanian (1998)). 
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1990s. During the 1990s, it was introduced in Switzerland27 and in Central and Eastern European 
countries.28 
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Figure 5. Adoption of the squeeze-out rule Figure 6. The use of voting caps  
 
(See comments to the Figure 3) 
Data source: Martynova and Renneboog (2004) corporate governance database.  
 
The pan-European acceptance of the equal-treatment principle can be regarded as the result 
of regulatory competition between the jurisdictions. Only the central European countries were 
lagging but have since 2001 all adopted this principle. Under the equal-treatment requirement, 
countries with a low ownership threshold triggering a mandatory bid are more likely to move 
towards dispersed ownership than countries that make a tender offer conditional on the acquisition 
of control. The recent trend to reduce the mandatory bid threshold in many European countries 
may result in some degree of convergence towards a market-based model.  
According to Figure 5, the squeeze-out provision is now commonly used in the English, 
German, and Scandinavian law countries. However, less than two-thirds of the French law 
jurisdictions had adopted the squeeze-out rule by 2004. About half the countries that joined the EU 
in 2004 also do not such a rule in place. However, it is likely that these countries will soon adopt 
                                                 
27 Until 1992, the principle was unwritten, but generally recognized at the level of company law. As from the 
1992-revision, it was incorporated in the law (art. 717 sec. 2 CO) in a qualified manner, providing for equal treatment 
under equal circumstances. Although the principle refers to the treatment of shareholders by the board of directors, it is 
recognized as a general principle. At the level of stock exchange regulations, takeover offers have had to comply with 
the principle of equal treatment of shareholders (art. 24 sec. 2 SESTA) since 1998. 
28 For example, in Bulgaria, the principle is explicitly provided in Art.181, Para. 3 of the Trade Act of 2000. In 
Cyprus, Section 69A of the Companies Law which was introduced in 2003 provides that: “the shareholders of a class 
of shares of a public company shall be equally treated by the company”. In the Czech Republic, the principle has 
existed since 2001 according to § 155/7 Commercial Code. 
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the rule. As in the case of the mandatory rule, the provisions of the squeeze-out rule vary 
substantially across countries. Thus, the threshold beyond which a bidder can force any remaining 
shareholders to sell their shares ranges from 80 percent (in Ireland) to 95 percent (in Belgium, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands), with a threshold of 90 percent in the majority of countries. 
The provisions for the fixing of the price for the squeeze-out purchase also differ between the 
jurisdictions. Although the adoption of the squeeze-out rule may encourage more control 
transactions, its impact on the ownership structure in countries with concentrated ownership is 
likely to be small, as the private benefits of holding control in these countries remain relatively 
high (Dyck and Zingales (2004)). To achieve ownership dispersion, the regulator needs to make 
control more contestable and thus combine the rule with provisions that reduce the incentives to 
hold controlling blocks.      
An interesting result arises from the analysis of the deviation from the one-share-one-vote 
principle. Figures 6-8 present the evolution of the adoption or rejection of voting arrangements in 
the form of non-voting shares, multiple voting shares, and voting caps, respectively. Figure 6 
shows the changes in the legal attitude towards voting caps. There is slow convergence towards the 
abolishment of voting caps. Still, voting caps prevail due to their ability to limit the power of 
blockholders. They are also a powerful takeover defence. Therefore, their abolishment in some 
European countries − such as those of French legal origin and the EU accession countries − is 
motivated by regulators wanting to stimulate the takeover market. However, banning voting caps 
in countries with concentrated ownership may reduce the contestability of corporate control and 
may thus prevent a well-functioning market of corporate restructuring from developing. Therefore, 
we project that the abolishment of voting caps in countries of French legal origin and the EU 
accession countries is likely to lead to even more concentrated voting power.  
Most countries, with the notable exception of the Scandinavian ones, allow the issue of 
non-voting shares, mainly in the form of preference shares which benefit from a preferential 
treatment in terms of dividend payments and/or in the case of a liquidation. The shares issued by 
most Scandinavian companies are voting shares, although they may bear each a different number 
of votes. For example, the votes from B-shares in Sweden are typically one tenth of the votes from 
A-shares. Usually, the law restricts the issue of non-voting shares to a maximum percentage of the 
equity. This percentage varies from 25 to 100 percent with 50 percent in the majority of the 
countries. In some countries, such as the UK, corporate law does not regulate the issue of 
differentiated voting shares, but the London Stock Exchange has discouraged such issues. This 
gentlemen’s agreement is well abided by as ‘it is just not cricket’ to issue non-voting shares 
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Figure 7. The use of non-voting shares  Figure 8. The use of dual-class and multiple voting shares 
  
(See comments to the Figure 3) 
Data source: Martynova and Renneboog (2004) corporate governance database. 
 
In contrast to the wide acceptance of non-voting shares (Figure 7), the use of dual class and 
multiple voting shares is declining (Figure 8). By 2004 only one third of the countries allowed 
shares with multiple voting rights, down from more than one half in the early 1990s. This trend 
towards abolishing multiple voting shares may be seen as a step towards similar corporate 
governance practice, the development of efficient M&A market, and greater ownership dispersion 
in the long run. 
 The European Commission’s proposed Takeover Directive received much resistance 
mainly as a consequence of the proposed break-through rule. Although Figure 9 may suggest that 
overall there is increasing adoption of the rule, this is mainly due to the countries that have 
recently joined the European Union. The only other country that has adopted the break-through 
rule is Italy. However, the break-through rule in Italy only applies to contractual agreements 
between shareholders, since shares cannot bear multiple voting rights. Pending a takeover bid, any 
shareholder who is willing to tender has the legal right to withdraw from voting or transfer 
agreements binding his shares. No minimum ownership percentage is required to qualify for this 
break-through rule. In addition, as outlined in sub-section 5.6, the rule may promote the creation of 
more complex ownership and control structures such as pyramids and cross-shareholdings thereby 
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Shareholders approval of anti-takeover devices 
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Figure 9. Adoption of the break-through rule  Figure 10. Adoption of the requirement of shareholders’ 
approval to install anti-takeover measures 
(See comments to the Figure 3) 
Data source: Martynova and Renneboog (2004) corporate governance database. 
 
Figure 10 refers to one of the hotly debated issues regarding the distribution of decision-
making in companies, namely the adoption of anti-takeover measures. Although some countries 
have opted for the American-style approach by allowing managers to apply anti-takeover devices 
when necessary, there is a clear move in Europe towards the British model which gives decision 
power to the shareholders. In general, in most countries, the board of directors may only take anti-
takeover measures after receiving the shareholders’ approval. However, there is variation with 
respect to the point in time when the adoption of anti-takeover measures can be solicited. For 
example, shareholders in Germany can vote for defence measures prior to a takeover bid, while in 
the UK they can only do so after the bid has been announced. General Principle 7 of the City Code 
‘prohibits any action to be taken by the board of the offeree company in relation of the affairs of 
the offeree company, without the approval of the shareholders in general meeting’. The rule does 
not prohibit corporate actions which have a frustrating effect on a takeover attempt, but it does 
require that such actions be approved by the shareholders at a general meeting and, crucially, that 
the approval be given ‘in the face of the bid’ (Davies and Hopt (2004)). There is a trend towards 
reducing the power of management in takeover-related decision-making. This suggests that the 
shareholder-centred view of corporate governance is receiving more widespread recognition. 
Consequently, this may result in convergence, albeit at a very slow rate, towards the market-based 




This paper argues that the effectiveness of the various functions of the takeover regulation 
depend on the corporate governance systems they are part of. However, at the same time, takeover 
regulation also has a significant impact on the efficiency of the corporate governance system. 
Therefore, a regulator who wants to reform takeover regulation needs to place this reform in the 
wider context of reforming corporate governance as a whole. Over the past 10 years, the European 
Commission has attempted to harmonize takeover regulation to create a level-playing field for an 
international market for corporate control. These attempts have nevertheless met with strong 
opposition from national lawmakers arguing that a unified takeover regulation may harm their 
national corporate governance system. Consequently, the proposed Takeover Directive was not 
adopted in 2004. To date, no consensus has been achieved about the best corporate governance 
system and whether individual EU member countries should change their regulation in order to 
move to a common corporate governance system. 
This paper shows that, despite all the controversies, the EU countries have individually 
undertaken steps towards the convergence of takeover and corporate governance regulation. 
Currently, the European countries agree that the equal treatment rule constitutes a fundamental 
principle of corporate law. There is also gradual convergence towards the adoption of the 
mandatory bid and squeeze-out rules. The introduction of lower thresholds for the disclosure of 
control as well as the abolishment of multiple voting rights, while allowing non-voting shares, may 
also be considered as further signs of convergence towards the Anglo-(American) system of 
corporate governance.  
However, it is important to note that similar regulatory changes may have very different 
effects within different corporate governance systems. For example, while in some countries the 
adoption of a specific takeover rule may lead towards more dispersed ownership, in others it may 
further reinforce the blockholder-based system. Moreover, there are still major differences across 
Europe in terms of the provisions of the mandatory bid rule (threshold and minimum offer price), 
the squeeze-out rule, and the distribution of the decision power between the board of directors and 
shareholders. Therefore, although there is some evidence of increasing convergence, this does not 
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Data appendix:  
 
The Martynova-Renneboog corporate governance database comprises the main changes in corporate governance 
regulation in 32 European countries (including countries from Central and Eastern Europe). The database is based on 
the results from a questionnaire sent to legal specialists. The questionnaire is on the various aspects of the corporate 
governance regimes and their evolution since the early 1990s. The questionnaire contains 50 questions that cover the 
most important provisions of company law, stock exchange rules, bankruptcy and reorganization law at both the 
national and European level. In particular, the questions cover the following: (i) shareholder and creditor protection 
regulation, (ii) accounting standards, (iii) disclosure rules, (iv) takeover regulation (mandatory bid, squeeze-out rule, 
takeover defence measures, etc.), (v) insider trading regulation, (vi) regulation regarding the structure of the board of 
directors and voting power distribution, (vii) and adoption of codes of good practice. The names of the legal experts 
who contributed to this database are presented below.  
 
Austria: Prof. Dr. Susanne Kalls (University of Klagenfurt), Prof. Dr. Christian Nowotny and Mr. Stefan Fida (Vienna 
University of Economics and Business Administration); 
Belgium: Prof. Dr. Eddy Wymeersch (University of Ghent, Chairman of the Commission for Finance, Banking and 
Assurance), Prof. Dr. Christoph Van der Elst (University of Ghent); 
Bulgaria: Dr. Plamen Tchipev (Institute of Economics, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences), Ms. Tania Bouzeva (ALIENA 
Consult Ltd., Sofia), Dr. Ivaylo Nikolov (Centre for Economic Development, Sofia); 
Croatia: Dr. Domagoj Racic and Mr. Josip Stajfer (The Institute of Economics, Zagreb), Mr. Andrej Galogaža 
(Zagreb Stock Exchange), Prof. Dr. Drago engi (IVO PILAR Institute of Social Sciences), Prof. Dr. Edita 
Culinovic-Herc (University of Rijeka); 
Cyprus: Mr. Marios Clerides (Chairman) and Ms. Christiana Vovidou (Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission); 
Czech Republic: Prof. Dr. Lubos Tichy, Mr. Martin Abraham, and Mr. Rostislav Pekar (Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, 
Cousellors at Law), Dr. Petr Kotáb and Prof. Dr. Milan Bakes (Charles University of Prague), Dr. Stanislav 
Myslil (ermák Hoejš Myslil a spol, Lawyers and Patent Attorneys), Dr. Jan Bárta (Institute of State and Law, 
The Academy of Science of Czech Republic), Ms. Jana Klirova  (Corporate Governance Consulting, Prague); 
Denmark: Prof. Dr. Jesper Lau Hansen and Prof. Dr. Ulrik Rammeskow Bang-Pedersen (University of Copenhagen);  
Estonia: Prof. Dr. Andres Vutt  (University of Tartu), Mr. Toomas Luhaaar, Mr. Peeter Lepik, and Ms Katri Paas 
(Law Office of Lepik & Luhaäär); 
Finland: Prof. Dr. Matti J. Sillanpää (Turku School of Economics and Business Administration), Mr. Ingalill Aspholm  
(Rahoitustarkastus/Financial Supervision Authority), Ms Ari-Pekka Saanio  (Borenius & Kemppinen, Attorneys 
at Law, Helsinki), Ms Johan Aalto (Hannes Snellman, Attorneys at Law; Helsinki); 
France: Prof. Dr. Alain Couret  (Université Paris I- Panthéon-Sorbonne), Ms. Joëlle Simon (MEDEF - French 
Business Confederation), Prof. Dr. Benoit Le Bars (MC Université de Cergy-Pontoise), Prof. Dr. Alain 
Pietrancosta (Universities of Tours and Paris I- Panthéon-Sorbonne), Prof. Dr. Viviane de Beaufort (ESSEC-
MBA), Prof. Dr. Gerard Charreaux (Université de Bourgogne Pôle d'économie et de gestion); 
Germany: Prof. Dr. Peter O. Muelbert (University of Mainz), Prof. Dr. Klaus Hopt and Dr. Alexander Hellgardt (Max 
Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law),  Prof. Dr. Theodor Baums and Mr. Tobias 
Pohl (Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main); 
Greece: Prof. Dr. Loukas Spanos (Centre of Financial Studies, University of Athens), Dr. Harilaos Mertzanis (Hellenic 
Capital Market Commission), Prof. Dr. Georgios D. Sotiropoulos (University of Athens); 
Hungary: Dr.Tamás Sándor (Sándor Bihary Szegedi Szent-Ivány Advocats), Dr. Andras Szecskay and Dr. Orsolya 
Görgényi (Szecskay Law Firm - Moquet Borde & Associés), Prof. Dr. Adam Boóc and Prof. Dr. Anna Halustyik 
(Corvinus University of Budapest); 
Iceland: Mr. Gunnar Sturluson and Mr. Olafur Arinbjorn Sigurdsson (LOGOS legal services), Dr. Aðalsteinn E. 
Jónasson  (Straumur Investment Bank and Reykjavik University), Mr. David Sch. Thorssteinsson (Iceland 
Chamber of Commerce); 
Ireland Republic: Dr. Blanaid Clarke (University College Dublin), Ms. Kelley Smith (Irish Law Library, Barrister); 
Italy: Prof. Dr. Guido Ferrarini and Mr. Andrea Zanoni (University of Genoa), Dr. Magda Bianco and Dr. Alessio 
Pacces (Banca d'Italia), Prof. Dr. Luca Enriques (Università di Bologna); 




Lithuania: Mr. Virgilijus Poderys (Chairman) and Ms. Egle Surpliene (The Securities Commission of Lithuania), Mr. 
Rolandas Valinas, Dr. Jaunius Gumbis, and Dr. Dovil Burgien (Lideika, Petrauskas, Valinas ir partneriai), 
Dr. Paulius Cerka (Vytautas Magnus University), Mr. Tomas Bagdanskis (Tomas Bagdanskis, Attorney at Law); 
Luxembourg: Mr. Jacques Loesch (Linklaters Loesch Law Firm), Mr. Daniel Dax (Luxembourg Stock Exchange); 
Netherlands: Prof. Dr. Jaap Winter (De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek, High Level Group of Company Law Experts 
European Commission Office (Chairman), University of Amsterdam), Mr. Marcel van de Vorst and Mr. Gijs 
van Leeuwen (Norton Rose Advocaten & Solicitors), Mr. Johan Kleyn and Dr. Barbara Bier (Allen & Overy 
LLP), Dr. Pieter Ariens Kappers (Boekel De Nerée), Prof. Dr. A.F. Verdam (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), 
Prof. Mr. C. A. Schwarz (Maastricht University); 
Norway: Prof. Dr. Kristin Normann Aarum (Oslo University), Prof. Dr. Tore Brathen (University of Tromsø), Prof. 
Dr. Jan Andersson (University of Bergen); 
Poland: Prof. Stanisław Sołtysiski and Dr. Andrzej W. Kawecki (The law firm of Sołtysiski Kawecki & Szlzak), 
Mr. Igor Bakowski (Gotshal & Manges, Chajec, Don-Siemion & yto Sp.k.), Dr. Piotr Tamowicz, Mr. Maciej 
Dzieranowski, and Mr. Michał Przybyłowski (The Gdask Institute for Market Economics), Ms. Anna 
Miernika-Szulc  (Warsaw Stock Exchange); 
Portugal: Mr. Victor Mendes (CMVM – Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários), Mr. Carlos Ferreira Alves 
(CEMPRE, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto), Prof. Dr. Manuel Pereira Barrocas (Barrocas 
Sarmento Rocha - Sociedade de Advogados), Dr. Jorge de Brito Pereira (PLMJ - A.M. Pereira, Sragga Leal, 
Oliveira Martins, J dice e Associados - Sociedade de Advogados), Dr. Manuel Costa Salema, Dr. Carlos Aguiar, 
and Mr. Pedro Pinto (Law firm Carlos Aguiar P Pinto & Associados), Mr. Antonio Alfaia de Carvalho (Lebre 
Sá Carvalho & Associados); 
Romania: Mr. Gelu Goran  (Salans, Bucharest office), Dr. Sorin David (Law firm David & Baias SCPA), Ms. Adriana 
I. Gaspar (Nestor Nestor Diculescu Kingston Petersen, Attorneys & Counselors), Mr. Catalin Baiculescu and 
Dr. Horatiu Dumitru (Musat & Associates, Attorneys at Law), Ms. Catalina Grigorescu (Haarmann Hemmelrath 
Law Firm); 
Russia: Dr. Aleksandra Vertlugina (AVK Security & Finance, St. Petersburg); 
Slovak Republic: Dr. Jozef Makuch (Chairman) and Dr. Stanislav Škurla (Financial Market Authority, Slovak 
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